Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President, House of Representatives Report No. 89-203 by Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. United States.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Congressional Materials Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive
3-24-1965
Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in
the Office of the Vice President, House of
Representatives Report No. 89-203
Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. United States.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials
Part of the Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Congressional Materials by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. United States., "Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of
the Vice President, House of Representatives Report No. 89-203" (1965). Congressional Materials. 14.
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials/14
89TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPORT1st Session J No. 203
PRESTI)ENTIAL, ABILITYY AND VACANCIES IN THEIOFFICE OF THE V[(CE PRESIDENT
MARICH 24, 1965.---Referred to the llouse (Calendar and ordere(l to be pIrinted
Mr. MNcCuilrocil, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
the following
REPORT
(To accompany II.J. Res. 1l
The Committee on the Judiciary, to wthoml was referred the joint
resolution (H.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the same,
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that
the joint resolution do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof thefollowing:
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part ofthe Constitution when, ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the severalStates within seven' years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article-
"SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation the Vice President shall become President.
"SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmationby a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEC. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declara-
tion that he ib unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, arid untilhe transmits a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shallbe discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
"SEC. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law pro-
vide, transmit to the PIresident pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shallimmediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
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"Thereafter, When the President transmits to the, President pro tempore of
'the Senate and the Speaker of the Iouse of Representative his written declara-
tion that no inability exists, he shall resume tle powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of tile executivedepartments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within
two clays to the President pro tempore of tile Senate and the Speaker of theHouse of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decidethe issue, immediately assembling for that purpose if not in session. If the Con-
gress, within ten days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
President and a majority of the principalfgfli¢ of, t^.e ey4tlv.y departments,
or such other body as Congress mayl by law provide, determines by two-thirds
vote of both Iouses that the President is unable to discharge the powers andduties of the office, thle Vice Iresident shall continue to discharge the same as
Acting President; otherwise the lPresident shall resume the powers and duties
of his office."
PURPOSE OF TIIE AMENDMENT
Thle principal purpose of the amendment is to distinguish betweeninability voluntarily declared by the President himself and inabilitydeclared without hls consent. In the former case, tle President can
resume his dutties by making a simple declaration that the inability has
ceased; in the latter, the measure provides procedures for )promptlydetermining the presence or absence of inability when that issue is
present.
The amendment makes no changes in sections 1 and 2 of the consti-
tutional amendment proposed by Iouse Joint Resolution 1 as intro-(duced; it does make changes in sections 3 and 4 and it eliminates
section 5 by merging the substance of that section with tliat of
section 4.
The changes made by the amendment in section 3 clarify the
procedure and clarify the consequences when the President himselfdeclares his inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
'I'here are two: First, the amendment indicates tihe officials to whom
the President's written declaration of inability shall be transmiitted,
namely the President pro temnpore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the Iouse of Representatives. The committee deemed it desirable
to add this specification which was absent from the joint resolution asintroduced. Second, the amendment makes clear that, in case of
such voluntary self-disqualification by tlhe President, the Presiden t's
subsequent transmittal to the same officials of a written declaration
to the contrary, i.e., a written declaration that no inability exists,
terminates the Vice President's exercise of the Presidential powers
and (duties, and that the President shall thereupon resume them.
Jn short, it is the intent of the committee that voluntary self-dis-qualification by the President shall be terminated byfthi President's
own declaration that no inability exists, without further ado. To
permit the Vice President and the Cabinet to challenge such an
assertion of recovery might discourage a President fronl voluntarily
relinquishing his powers in case of Illness. The right of challenge
would be reserved for cases in which the Vice President and Cabinet,
without the President's consent, had found him unable to dischargehis powers and duties.
Sections 4 and 5 of the amendment proposed by House Joint Reso-
lution 1, as introduced, dealt respectively with thle devolution upon
thle Vice President, as Acting President, of the President's powers and
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duties pursuant to a declaration of his inability made by the VicePresident and other officials, and with the procedure upon subsequentdeclaration by the President' that no inability exists.
The amendment places the substance of former section 5 into section
4, in order to emphasize the committee's intent that the procedureprovided by former section 5 relates only to cases in which Presidentialinability has been declared by others than the President. Two identi-
cal changes are made in former sections 4 and 5. First, the term
"priifcipal dffice~rs of the'executive departments" is substituted for the
term "heads of the executive departments" to make it clearer that only
officials of Cabinet rank should participate in the decision as to whether
presidential inability exists. Tile substituted language follows more
closely article II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that
the President may require the opinion in light "of the principal officersin each of the executive departments * * *." The intent of the com-
mittee is that the Presidential appointees who direct the 10 executivedepartments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive department es-
tablished in the future, generally considered to comprise the Presi-dent's Cabinet, would participate, with the Vice President, in deter-
mining inability. In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sick-
ness of the head of any executive department, the acting head of thedepartment would be authorized to participate in a presidentialinability determination.iThe second change made in former sections 4 and 5 is to specify
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives as the congressional officials to whom declaration
concerning Presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in
section 3.
The language of former section 5 of House Joint Resolution 1 is
further amended to make clear that if Congress is not in session at
the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of a written declaration
by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments contradicting a Presidential declaration that
no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for the pur-
pose of deciding the issue. Finally, the language of former section 5is further amended by providing that in such event the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Congress within
10 days after receipt of such declaration of Presidential inability de-determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is in
fact unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
'The committee deems it essential in the interest of stability of
government to limit to the smallest possible period the time during
which the vital issue of the executive power can remain in doubt.
Under the bill, following a Presidential declaration that the disability
previously declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to suchdeclaration must be made within 2 days of its receipt by the heads of
the Housed of Congress and must be finally determined within thefollowing 10 days. Otherwise the President, having declared himself
able, will resume his powers and duties. An unlimited power in
Congress might afford an irresistible temptation to temporize
with respect to restoring the President's powers. In this highly
charged area there is no room for equivocation or delay.
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STATEMENT
For its report herein the committee adopts in substantial measure
the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany
Senate Joint Resolution 1, namely, Senate Report No. 66, 89th Con-
gress, 1st session:
The constitutional provisions
'The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the Executive
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a Presi-dent. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5, reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability,both of the President and 'Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by theConstitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exer-
cise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear
that this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately
submitted was a considerable alteration of the proposal which tho
Committee had received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with thequestion of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the ConstitutionalConvention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
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The question is not answered so farl as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice Presi-dent John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under thisprovision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the Prosident of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave ainwer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of SenatorWilliam Allen, of Ohio, tle Vice President (Tyler) was later recognizedby both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Con-gressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31-
June 1, 1841).
This.precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents .have succeeded to the Presidency ofthe United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish aprecedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, orinability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability," North American Review,
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
The Tyler precedent, therefore has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated Presi(ent to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight; who letter became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or thie power andduties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as Presi-dent, to declare that t0te powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed. the prerogatives of the Presidency. Thisinterpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5, of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, ini the absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic supplied.]
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Thle doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed nlateri-
ally to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when it President was disabled. 'The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when P'resident Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President (Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
performed but one official act, the signing of al extradition paper.
'lere is little doubt but that there wore pressing issues before tile
executive departmentt at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. (omnmissiols were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be (lis)osed of by theheads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trlumbull, Judgge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler, and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, 1)1p. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that (lay, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of tile
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Ca(binet members were
said to be of tlio opinion that there could 1)e n11 te1111)orary (evolution
of Presidential power on thei Vice President. This groul) reportedlyincluded tlhe then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
vlacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it wouldbe (lesiral)lo for the Vice President to act but since tlhey could not
agree upon tile ability of tile President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them frompresenting the issue to himl directly tlhe matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing Urgency again. Tiis
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time \when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as tlhe Shan-
tung Settlement were unresolved. 'rie British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by tle President.
Twerity-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Pi'esidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendnmenits, pp. 232-235). The President's
wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screeningboard on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impatiriment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs,'
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Folrty-to Yeats in the White House," ppi
105-106; Tumnulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-138.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered tile advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
to the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
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of that (lay that ho reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting,
such a possibility (Joseph P'. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon tile Presilent's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacementt of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged isldoyalty to the President (Tulmulty, "Woo(drow.
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidentsinvolving the physical health of the Pre'sident served to focus attention
on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned aiboult the gap in theConstitution relative to Presidential inability, and ho attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of tan informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President woull, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would servo
as Acting President, exercising tlh powers and duties of the.
office until the inability had ended.
2. In tile event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appro-.
priate. ulider the circumstances, would decide upon the devolu-
tion of the powers and dutiess of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would ldtermine when theinaiiility had en(led and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnsonas did President Johnson witl Speaker John
McCormaclk and Vice President Iubert Huml)hrey. Such informal
agrCeemlents cannot I)e considered an adequate solution to the problem
l)ecause: (A) Their operation would differ according to the relation-
ship between the particular holders of the offices; (13) a private
agreement cannot give the Vice Presidenlt clear authority to dis-
charge powers confer'red on the Presidentlby tlie Constitution,
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is ltmalde for tlie situation in
which t dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well as Attormey.
General Kennedy agree that the only definitive Iethod to settle lthe
problems is by means of a constitutional amendment.
THE NEED FOI CHANGE
The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The.
clause couples the contingencies of a permalllnent nature sucht as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which mllay be temporary. It does not clearly commit tlhe determi-
nation of inability to any individual or group, nor (loes it defineinability so that tile existence of such at status Imay be open al(d
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity ill wVhich tile Vice Presi-
dent acts during a period of inability of the Presildent. It fails todefine the period during which the Vice Presildent serves.. It does
not specify that a recovered Presidenlt maly regain the prerogatives
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of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recoveredfrom his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented fromdoing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Execu-tive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at tines
when a President is disabled. Contiinuity of Execuitive authority is
more important tocdty than ever before. The concern which has been
manifested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, isincreased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of theincreased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the UnitedStates and to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified exami-
nation of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized becauseits proceldulres have not. been clear. After 176 years of experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro
vision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE
In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of tile major considerations has been whether Congress could con-
stitutiionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
resentatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under theConstitution, and that an .amendment would first have to be adopted(hearings before the Committee on tlheJudiciary, House of Rep-
resentatives, Febrpary 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the Presidential inabilityproblem.
Those who feel hlat Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. Theypoint out that article II, section 1,.clause 5, of the Constitution author-ized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the Presi-dent. and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implicationCongress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presi-dential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitutionl did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
8
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18 gives theCongress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitutiondoes not vest any department or office with tlie power to determineinability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether'and at what time the President inay later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to arguethat article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the authority
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seeins to have been a strong shift of opinionin favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment' is neces-
sary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve theproblem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting AttorneyGeneral Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition to the American Bar Association and' the
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizationshave'agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York;Passaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; andMilWaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of aniending the Constitutionis that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendinent that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge atthe most critical time-that is, either when a President had becomedisabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent, need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the conmencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the office of the President
While the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
The creation of thie office of Vice President came in the closingdays of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention.later proposals envisagedthe President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should a
lapse of Executive authority come to pass.On Septefiber 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recom-
mended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties tobe performed by the occupant of the Office. Although much de-liberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
H. Rept. 203, 89-1--2
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thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice Presi-dent to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become theConstitution of the United States. It contemplated two officialduties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of hisdeath, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitltion does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, theimportance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparentby article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provisionfor the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Conveltion, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which articleII, section 1, clause- 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of siinilar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with thegrowing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appeasedisappointed factions of the parties, began a- decline that was in
ensuing years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority
and disparagement.Fortunately, this century saw agradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of theCabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-portunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE URGENCY OF AMENDMENT
The death of Piesideit Kennedy and the accession of Piesident
Johnson in 1963 pointed up once again tie abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
times the United States of America has been without a Vice President,
totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutionald Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter itito a determination of whetherprovisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
10
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and sup-
ported by many individuals: We must not gamble with the consti-
tutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.IThe argument tiat Congress can designate a Vice President by lawis at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is meas-
ured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6, which states that--
the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as Presi-dent, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor.Vice President to act. ;
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of tihe
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice. President is vacant, Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating tliat officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and ditices of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer, to, that question is "Yes." The.Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article , section 2, clause 4,
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its otier officers
incluldilg a "Presidentl pro T'empore, in the Absince of the Vice Presi-dent or when he shall exercise the Office Qf the President of tlie United
States." It is very difficult to argue tliat a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the pro-
cedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22, can be the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the.person next in line to becomefamiliar with the problems he will face should hee called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, ead the
Presidents Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, partici-pate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. TI:ose who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
11
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the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential suc-
cessing law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time ofhis designation as Vice President, however,he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer itdesignates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations lead-
ing to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendmentbut that the President be given an active role in the procedure what-
ever it be.
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument infavor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority col-
cerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With thisdivision in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolutelegitimacy was needed.
ANALYSIS
Inability
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a con-
stitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution is unclear on twoimportant points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the VicePresident in the event of Presidential inttbility. The second is whohas the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,further extending the practice to te conti es of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inabilityfrom those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby elim-inating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.Sections 3 and 4 embrace tie procedures for determining the com-
nlencement and terminaitio of Presidential inability.Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that hasheretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person iiext in the line of succession. It makes clearthat the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes clear
that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the-offce"
that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the status ofthe Vice President during thie period when he is discharging thepowers and duties of a disabled President.
The amendment to section 3 makes certain that in cases in which
a President himself declares his inability, the period of his disability
would be terminated by a simple Presidential notice to both Houses
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of Congress. To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge
such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President from vol-
untarily relinquishing his powers in case of illness. The right of chal-lenge would be reserved for cases in which the Vice President and
the Cabinet, without the President's consent, had found him unable
to discharge his powers and duties.Section 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment deals with the
most difficult probleil of inability-the factual determination of
whether or not inability exists. It provides that whenever the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executivedepartments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a posesslon of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. :No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutionalpropriety exist'. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted thatpresumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at thehighest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears tofurnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicialbranches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably mostfamiliar with his condition. It is assumedthat such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distingiiihed advocates for a specially constituted
group in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidentialinability!rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannotdeclare his own inability the factual determination of inability wouldbe relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfindingbody. Nor is a factnnding body necessary if the President can anddoes declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling: to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dis-
pute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,for example,'if a commission of seven voted four to three that the Presi-dent was fit and able to perform his office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
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what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placedin this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the in-
ternational position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future; the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different bodyif this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience,
The second paragraph of section 4 of the proposed amendment
would permit the Presidenit to resume the powers and duties of the
office upon his transmission to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of his written declaration
that no inability existed. However, should 'the Vice President and
a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments feel
that the President is unable, then they could prevent the Presidentfrom' resuming the powers' and duties of the' office by transmitting
their written declaration so stating to the President'of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days. Once
the declaration of the President stating no inability exists has been
transmitted to the President'of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then the issue is squarely joined. At this
point the proposal recommends. that the Congress shall make, thefinal determination on the existence of inability. If .within '10 days
the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of botli Houses that the
President is unable, then' the Vice President continues. as Acting
President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner to cart
a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the' position
that the President'was unable to perform the powers' and tiess o6fhis office, then the President would, resume after the expiration of10 days the powers and dutie's of the office. The recommendationfor a vote of two-thirds is in conformity with the provision, of article I,
section 3, clause' 6, of the Constitution relating to impeachmients.
The committee contmplates that votes taken pursuanttothote'pro-
visions of the proposed constitutional amendment will be conductedin accordance with the rules of the House and Senate;, respectively,
and that record votes may be taken when in conformity with 'such rules.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transferin Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the originallintent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacanites
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nationi will
always possess 'a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person who meets the existing constitutional qualifications
.to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once 'he has been
confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was'observed' that the
office of the Vice President' has become one of the most importantpositions in our country. The days are long past when it was largelyhonorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
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For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific andimnpoitant responsibilities il the executive branch of Governmenlt.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy there would be nobreak in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is com-patible with the President. Tlie importance of this compatibilityis recognized in the modern practice of both major political partiesin according the presidential candidatesa major voice in choosing his
running mate subject to convention approval. This proposal wouldpermit the President to choose his Vice President subject to congres-
sional approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice
President of the same political party as the President, someone who
would presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the
President.
The committee recommends adoption of the joint resolution as
amended.
COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER, AND RETAINED WORDING
The committee amendments to the House joint resolution are
shown as follows: Provisions of the resolution as introduced which
are omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed initalic, provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
Article-
SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shallbecome President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upoil confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
SEC 3. [If the President declares in writing] Whenever the
President transmits to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his writtendeclaration that he is unable to discharge the powers andduties of his office, and until he transmits a written declaration
to the contrary such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice Presidenit as Acting President.
SEC. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a majority of theheads of the executive departments orsuch other bod asCongress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his]
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal
officers of the executive departments, or such other body asCongress may by law provide, transmit to the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives their written declaration that the President is
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unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, theVice President shall immediately assume the powers andduties of the office as Acting President.[SEC. 5.] Thereafter, when ever] the President transmits
to the [Congress] President Pro Tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the'louse of Representatives his written declara-tion that no inability exists, he shalll resume the powers andduties of his office unless the Vice President, [with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the execu-tive departments or such other body as Congress may by law!provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his] and
a majority of the principal officers of the execute e departments,
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit
within two days to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the Hlouse of Representatives their writtendeclaration that the President is unable to discharge thepowers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall[immediately] decide the issue, immediately assembling forthat purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten(lays after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the execu-
tive departments, or such other body as Congress may by lawprovide, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses thatthe President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office.
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE
EDWARD HUTCHINSON
House Joint Resolution 1, as reported, would ratify the Tylerprecedent of succession to the office of President by the Vice President
upon the death of the President; it would provide for filling a vacancyin the office of Vice President; and it would incorporate into the
'Constitution a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive powerfrom the President to the Vice President in times of the President's
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
THE TYLER PRECEDENT
No, reasonable question any longer exists about the constitutional
succession to the office of President by the Vice President upon thedeath of the President. Vice President Tyler's claim to the office
as well as its powers and duties, upon the death of President W. H.
Harrison in 1841, has without exception been asserted on every
subsequent like occasion. The country would not now accept anydifferent construction of the constitutional provision, nor would any
different construction be' warranted. There is no disagreement over
section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1. It makes clear that whenever
.a vacancy in the office of President occurs,' whether by removal, death
or resignation, the Vice President will assume the office as well as its
powers and duties.
FILLING A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY
Section 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 would empower'and direct
the President to nominate a Vice President when that office is vacant,
and the citizen so noriinated would take office when confirmed by a
majority vote of both Hoi'ses of Congress,
While it is generally assumed each House would act separately,
the language employed requires a majority vote of both Houses, not
each House, to confirm. If, sometime in the future, pressure is brought
to bear for congressional 'confirmation' in joint convention, as someproponents of this measure now advocate, the language of section2 may be construed to require only a majority of both Houses com-bined, in that way diluting 'the vote of Senators. In my opinion,
this possibility would be lessened if the language directed the majority
vote in each Hoise instead of a majority vote of both Houses.
Although the section is silent on the point, it is expected that the
majority vote required, so long as each House acts separately, is a
majority of the votes cast in each House, a quorum being present.
There is no requirement for a record vote, but one-fifth of those
present could require it. A secret ballot could not be ordered over
their objections.
Procedure for confirmation of nominations }ty the President by
both Houses is unique in oifr experience. All other appointments are
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submitted only to the Senate, for advice and consent. A good case
could be made for submission of this nomination to the Senate alone.
After all, the sole constitutional duty of the Vice President remains
that of President of the Senate; and within the purview of the Con-
stitution, the President, by nominating a Vicq President, is choosingtheir Presiding Officer. Senate approval of his fiominee, as in the
case of other Presidential appointments, certainly would have been
thought sufficient in earlier periods of our history, and may be sufficient
today.
The case for Sonate' action alone also can be buttressed by an
analogy, In-those cases where a Vice President is not elected, because
of a failure of a majority of the electoral vote, the Constitution:directs 'the Senate to elect one from the candidates who received the
two'highest numbers.
Finally, in the case for Senate confirmation alone, it iay be'observed
that our constitutional processes for the selection of our Presidents
and Vice Presidents are Federal in nature.' Presidential electors,
chosen in each State in such manner as the legislature may direct,
meet in' their respective States and there cast the votes to which their
State is entitled. The Senate, too, is a body FedliIl in nature. Each
State has an equal vote in the Senate. The Senate represents tle'
States in our legislative 'branch. It wold be wholly consistent with'
the preservation of the Federal structure' if the Senate were vested
with power either to elect'a Vice President to fill a vacancy, or to
advise and consent to the nomination of the President for that purpose
Thus farin our history there has been a vacancy in the office of Vice
President during a part of 16 different terms.' One vacancy was
caused'by resignation of the Vice President. Seven died in office and
the other eight succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the'
President.
On those occasions when the Vice President's office becomes vacant
through removal, death, or resignation, it is possible that some divisionin Congress might occur over confirmation of a President's nomination
of a successor. But onl.those occasions when a vacancy is due' to a
Vice President's succession to tihe Presidency, and the new Presidenit
so recently a Vice President himself, is called upon to noiiniate
another, the. temper of the country and of the Congress is likely tobe such as to make congressional confirmation of the appointmentpro forma. Under such circumstances, how meaningful really is thefunction of congressional confirmation? The new President might
as well be empowered to appoint a new Vice President outright.Consider the terrible pressures that will immediately come to bear.
on a newly elevated President to choose a Vice President. No time
is specified within which the nomination must be made, but it wouldbe a mistake to believe the new President coilld relieve the pressureby putting the matter off. As soon as he enters tiie residential stage,
the new President will see.prospective Vice Presideits and their sup-porters in the wings. In addition to all of the other cares, duties,
and responsibilities thrust. upon him,he will also have to deal withthose who aspire to the second highest office of the land--the largestplum within his hands.
A better solution to the problem of succession to the office of Vice
President would be to provide that the holder of some other office in
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the administration' should automatically succeed to' the Vice-Presidency. ;
It is hard enough for the country to go through the sad experience
of a change of administration at the time of the death of a President,
when the succession is automatic. That is the situation now and as
it has been. Since 1792 there has always been a known successor to
the office of President when there was no Vice President. But uponthe ratification of this proposed amendment, there will be. an air of
uncertainty, a'tlehst for the time during-'which it takes a newlyPrsident
to nominate and obtain confirmation of his choice-and this uhcer-
tainty will be experienced at a time when the country can least bear it.
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House Joint Resolution 1 would incorporate into the Constitution
a detailed procedure for the transfer, of Executive power from. the
President. to the Vice President in times of the President's inability todischarge the powers and duties of his office. Such .transfer can occur
with' the President's consent or over his protest. The language of the
resolution offers no hint .that the determination of inabilty shall bebased on medical or psychiatric evidence. Instead, the determination
will be apolitical one; and herelies'a danger, in the;proposal.
Words written into the Constitution in the past are now found tohave vested powers to extents and in ways pot intended hy their
authors. We should. be extremely careful, lest we unwittingly pro-
vide tools of power we would ourselves oppose.Do the provisions :of section 4 of this resolution in effect create'a
new way in which a President might be removed from office? Mightit be possible for a Vice President, sometime in the future, to form a
cabal with a majority of the President's Cabinet and size power.fromhim?. Are we, by incorporating these words. into the Constitution,providing;the machinery by which the stability of the office of Presi-dent might be undermined? All it takes, under section 4, is for the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet to file their writtendeclaration of the President's inability with the President pro. tempore
of the Senate 'and the Speaker of the House, and theVice Presidentbecomes Acting President.: Then the President, dislodged by this
maneuver from his awesome powers, is put in the position of having
to in' back his position by persuading Conigress of his' fitness:. Here
again the decision will be a political one. There is no suggestion that
medical or psychiatric evidence even be considered. And, if an
unpopular President should fail to find support among at least athird of the Senators and Representatives in Congress, he would
continue in name only, shorn of his powers and duties. He could
apparently make repeated attempts to regain the powers of his office
until his term expires. Would these circumstance lend stability to
the:country. or undermine it?
On the other hand, suppose an unpopular President is upheld by the
Congress with more than one-third, but less than a majority of the
Members sustaining his contention of ability to serve. Is it not
possible the same cabal might try again? The President wouldbreak it up, if possible, by changes in his Cabinet, providing he could
win the advice and consent of' the Senate for his new appointees, b.ut
under such circumstances he might not obtain confirmation of his
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Cabinet changes. Would these circumstances tend to lend stability
to the Government or undermine it?
Other assumptions might be made to illustrate further how the
machinery we now offer the country might sometime be used by men
ambitious for power.
We should keep in mind that we are fashioning tools which couldbe used to unsettle the stability of our Government while we mean to
promote it.Section:4,is certainly not intended, to provide the tools for power to
evil men. Its drafters had in mind an altogether different situation.
They suppose an ill President, physically unable to give his consent for
the assumption of power by the Vice President. Under these circum-
stances some alternative to his consent must be devised if the Govern-
ment is to carry on. Thereafter, when the President has recovered
sufficiently to resume his duties, or thinks he has, the drafters wanted
to be sure of machinery whereby;he could recover his powers from a
Vice President and Cabinet who might disagree with his own assess-
ment of recovery.
Supporters of this proposal call the power of public opinion to theirdefense and say a Vice President and Cabinet, would not dare seize
power from a President physically and mentally able, nor withholdpower from him once'recovered. But public opinion can be molded,
and some Presidents in our history have been most unpopular in
office, and probably there will ,be some in the future.
There is no definition of inability or disability in the proposed
amendment, nor is there any provision for the definition of this term.
If there has existed an uncertainty of congressional power to defineit under existing constitutional provisions, it is clear Congress will be
without power to define an inability after House Joint Resolution 1is incorporated into the Constitution.
The proposal will leave to the President in section 3; and to the
Vice President and Cabinet majority in section 4, complete power to
treat any condition. or circumstance they choose as a disability. It is
even conceivable, though I hope not likely, that some President mightdeclare himself unable, and state no reason therefore (since no reason is
required by the language) in order to avoid responsibility for some
unpopular act, devolving the powers of his office upon the VicePresent.for-the time. ibeini to accomplish that purpose. After
ratification of House Joint Resolution 1, the Congress definitely
cannot define by law what constitutes Presidential disability. I think
a good case can be made to vest that power of definition in Congress.
Here would be another check and balance in our system, built in to
guard against abuse of power.
It was suggested in the hearings that the President might declarehis inability because of absence from the country. It seems unlikely
that he would do so because he would want to go abroad with full
powers of his office, as Presidents have (lone in the past. But members
should know that in theminds of some, thelanguageof this proposal
will permit a future President to relieve-hiimself of the burdens of his
office, at will, by a declaration of inability due to absence.
The provisions of House Joint Resolution 1 leave many questions
unresolved. For example, it does not address itself to the problem of
what happens if an Acting President suffers an inability. It overlooks
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the possibility of a Presidential inability at a time when there is noVice President, which might occur soon after a new President'succedede
to office and before he nominated a new Vice President. How could
the machinery of section 4 work then? Under the language of that
section, it would appear essential that there be a Vice President to
trigger the machinery of that section
In my opinion it would be better to work out the answers to theseproblems and others before submitting this proposed amendment for
ratification. There is no real urgency. We now have a Vice President,
and an executive understandii'g between him'and th'e Pres.ideit on the
matter of Presidential disability. We should not rush this proposal
on its way until it is as perfect as we can make it. These other
problems will remain unsolved and those who are concerned about a
certainty of succession and ability will continue to press for further
amendments.
It will be tragic if we have unwittingly deprived Congress of power
to move into any breach in the structure here being fashioned.
Respectfully submitted.
EDWARD HTTCHINSON.
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DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES McC.
MATHIAS, JR.
I dissentrfrom the views of the majority of the comriittee with
respect to the grant of power to the President to nominate his heir. I
oppose such power as being in conflict with the basic principles of the
Republic and the philosophy of the Constitution which tends to dis-
perse, rather than to centralize, power.
The Presidency has always been considered an elective office, but it
will not be purely elective if this amendment is adopted.
.The Constitutional Convention, as we know it through Madison's
Journal, would surely have rejected an appointed Vice President ongrounds of principle alone. Modern conditions, while compelling,do not dictate that we abandone principle when we provide a modern
method of succession.
The Copstitution seeks means to interpose legal safeguards between
the weakness, the temptations, and the evil of men and the opportunity
to injure the state. We do the same in private life when we ask anhonest debtor to execute a mortgage or an honorable man to state his
promise or covenant in writing.
By permitting the President to name a Vice President, House Joint
Resolution 1 operates on the opposite principle, assuming that a
President will always be enlightened and disinterested in naming a
Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 20th Cen-
tury's opinion of itself in contrast to the pragmatic 18th century
estimate of human frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for constitu-
tional law.
Congressional confirmation of a vice-presidential nominee would be
only a mild check and, in my judgment, would be a mere formalityin a period of national emotional stress. Most of us who were herein the last dark days of November 1963 would confirm that almost
any such request made by President Johnson would have been favor-
ably received by the Congress in our desire to support and stabilize his
administration.
Giving the:President exclusive power to nominate a Vice President
has been justified by a false analogy to the broad discretion allowed
modern presidential nominees to express a preference for their running
mates. But a presidential nominee and an incumbent President are
very different mnen-even if they inhabit the same mortal frame-and
they may::be moved, by very different motives. A President securein the White House will have undergone a metamorphosis from his
earlier self, insecurely and temporarily occupying the presidential
suite at the Blackstone or the Mark Hopkins during the climax of a
national convention.
If the presidential nominee really is allowed a personal choice of
running mates, he will seek a candidate to complement his own candi-dacy and to strengthen the ticket. He will want an attractive,
vigorous, and patently able associate. The electability of the vice-
22
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 23
presidential candidate is a form of accountability for the head of theticket. By way of example, recall the probable motives of Senator
John F. Kennedy in choosing Lyndon B. Johnson for his running
mate and consider whether the same motives would have been decisive
with President John F. Kennedy.
Furthermore, the analogy used to justify this amendment would
crystallize contemporary political custom into organic law. Currentpractice at national political conventions and conventions themselves
are the creatures of custom only. Customs can and should change as
social, political and technological changes affect our way of living.
The Constitution cannot and should not be so flexible.
The public today is all too ready to impugn the motives of a
President dealing with his Vice President. It is hinted that a Presi-
dent is constantly tempted to relegate the Vice President to a subor-
dinate role in political life. If such motives are credible in dailygovernmental relations, how much more would they be present in the
selection of an heir end successor.
Couple this consideration to the provisions of House Joint Resolu-
tion 1 with respect to Presidential inability and the considerations
that might move a President to nominate a respectable, but pallid,
Vice President. If the heir apparent is to gain certain powers ofdeposition as well as natural succession, a President may indeed hesi-
tate in seeking a vigorous and aggressive Vice President. Such a
danger would not have escaped examination by the framers of theConstitution and should be considered by those who propose to
amend it.
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr.
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